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Abstract _ 
We model pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social sucurity systems as the outcome of majority voting 
within a standard OLG model with production and an exogenous population growth rateo At each 
point in time individuals work, save, consume and invest by taking the social security policy as 
given. The latter consists of a tax on current wages transferred to elderly people. When they vote, 
individuals have to make two choices: Ifthey want to keep the cornmittment made by the previous 
generation by paying the elderly the promised amount of benefits, and which amount they want 
paid to themselves next periodo We show that when the growth rate of population is high enough 
compared to the productivity of capital there exists an equilibrium where PAYG pensions are 
voted into existence and maintained. PAYG systems are kept even when everybody knows that 
they will surely be abondoned, and that sorne generation will pay and not be paid back. We 
characterize the steady state and dynamic properties of these equilibria and study their welfare 
properties. Equilibria achieved by voting are typically inefficient; however, they may be so due 
to overaccumulation, as well as, in other cases, due to under accumulation. On the other hand, 
the efficient steady states turn out to be dynamically unstable: so we are presenting an unpleasant 
alternative for policy making. 
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1. IlltroductiOll. 
V\Te are aging, and this may be more that just our personal and unavoidable experience. 
Indeed around the world, and particularly in the most advanced countries, the average 
citizens is becoming older. A sharp increase in the population's proportion of elderly and 
retired individuals has occurred in the last twenty years. An even more drastic shift in the 
sarne direction will take place in the near future should the current demographic trends 
continue. 
This has caused the political debate to move from the previous concentration on ex-
panding the social security system, to concerns about the future viability of the system 
itself. Substantial reforms have already been implemented in sorne countries (Chile, Ar-
gentina) or are explicitely being proposed or even starting to be implemented elsewhere 
(Italy, Spain, Sweden). It is very likely that in the next twenty years similar phenomena 
will spread around the globe and that we will be facing the necessity to introduce drastic 
modifications in the way in which our social securit~r systems are organized and runo 
Evaluating the social and economic impact of these predictions requires more than an 
examination of the demographic assumptions from which they are derived. It also requires 
an understanding of the process of decision making through which social security systems 
are managed. 
Pension systems are defined benefit systems which are at best partially funded, with 
the unfunded "pay-as-you-go" (PAYG) portion growing over time. Most often even in 
system that began as partially funded the current receipts from contributions and the 
income from previous investments are no longer adequate to cover current benefits and the 
contribution rate is subject to periodical increments. These changes have not occurred by 
chance, but have been the outcome of an historical evolution in which the political conflicts 
between different interest groups and the intervention of the state in the provision of other 
public services have played a major role. Indeed the current system of social welfare and 
public goods provision (pensions, health services, educational services) appears as a unity 
in which when one part is modified or taken away other parts have also to be changed. 
As suggested by Becker and Murphy (1988), in modern societies the welfare system is 
better interpreted as the outcome of a rather sophisticated intergenerational agreement 
that, through the channel of the state and of the political system, solves a bargaining 
problem which originates fmm within the family and which involves at the same time the 
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education of young generations, the care of the elderly and the provision of assistance to 
individuals unable to work. 
In the literature one can find a variety of different explanations for why social security 
systems have been introduced (e.g. Becker and Murphy (1988), Diamond (1977), Kotlikoff 
(1987), Lazear (1979), Merton (1983), Sala-i-Martin (1992)). They seem to concentrate 
around the idea that public pension systems are efficency enhancing, either because of the 
overaccumulation that would occur without them, 01' because they provide for efficient 
risk-sharing in presence of incomplete annuities markets and adverse selection, 01' because 
they are a way around the lack of efficient intergenerational credit markets, 01' because of 
the presence of pervasive negative extemalities, etcetera. 
\\Thile we find each of these motivations compelling, we believe a c1earer theoretical 
understanding of the nature of social security systems requires an explicit consideration 
of their redistributive features and of the fact that they are sustained by the consensus 
of a majority of the population. This is particularly true for pay-as- you-go (PAYG) 
systems (as opposed to Capital-Reserve (CR)), which have now become the rule in almost 
all advanced countries. \Ve are far from being the first to c1aim that PAYG social security 
systems redistribute income between generations. 1'his was made c1ear by Edgar Browning 
a while ago with two important artic1es, Browning (1973, 1975). He also pointed out 
that. because of the potential for intergenerational redistribution, median voter models 
predict that public social security plans will tend to be larger than required by economic 
efficiency. A numher of contributions c1arifying and extending Browning's initial intuition 
have followed since (see Verbon (198i) for a relatively recent update). 
The temporal credibility problem of a PAYG pension system in the context of an 
OLG model with majority voting rule has been analysed in Sjoblom (1985). He considers 
a stationary environment, without capital accumulation 01' production, and shows that in 
the one-shot game there is no Nash equilibrium with SoSeSy. In the repeated game he 
shows that there is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium at which each pIayer may achieve a 
pre-selected level of utility. 1'his is shown in a deterministic setting by a priori restricting 
the set of beliefs adopted by the players. A median voter model of the Social Security 
System is also in Boadway and 'Vildasin (1989). 
A related approach is that of 1'abellini (1991) who studies the intertemporal sustain-
ability of public debt in a two- period model with intergenerational altruismo He shows 
that, even without a commitment technology, a majority voting mechanism will lead a 
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coalition formed by the first generation and the wealthiest portion of the second 1.0 ap-
prove full repayment of the debt even if the latter ex-ante redistributes income from the 
second 1.0 the first generation. 
More recently Esteban and Sákovics (1993) have looked at institutions that can trans-
fer income or wealth over time and across generations in the context of an OLG model. 
They model the creation of "institutions" by means of a fixed cost and consider both non-
cooperative and cooperative games among generations. The basic intuition is similar 1.0 the 
one we use here, that is 1.0 say that "trust" can be built over time and maintained in order 
1.0 achieve superior outcomes. On the other hand they do not model the voting mechanism 
explicitely and are not interested in the dynamic interactions between the transfer system 
and the process of capital accumulation. Their anaIysis is nevertheless relevant to our 
own investigation as they characterize the efficiency properties of such institutions and the 
increase in efficiency achievable as set-up costs are reduced. 
At least three aspects of the problem seem 1.0 have remained 111 the background: 
a) the set of conditions under which a PAYG social security scheme remains viable in 
an intertemporal context, when agents are selfish and are called 1.0 vote upon it in each 
period b) the dynamic properties of such a system in the presence of an explicitely modelled 
accumulation of productive capital and a stochastic population growth rate; c) the impact 
that changes in the exogenous growth rate of population and of technological progress 
may have on this dynamics. The theoretical framework presented here should allow for 
a careful examination of these issues. '~Te show that a PAYG public pension plan is a 
subgame perleet equilibrium of a majority voting game in an OLG model with production 
and capital accumulation when the growth rate of population and the initial stock of capital 
satisfy a certain set of restrictions t. '~Te characterize the properties of such systems for the 
general case and then give a detailed characterization of our model economy for selected 
functional forms of the utility function, the production functions and the stochastic process 
of the growth rate of population. 
For reasons of analytical simplicity we restrict our analysis 1.0 the case in which only 
the growth rate of the population is uncertain, but it would be relatively straightforward 
1.0 duplicate the same results in the presence of random technology shocks affecting the 
marginal productivity of labor. 
t In Bolclrin and R lIstichi ni () 995b) t.his analysis is ext.ended 1.0 the case oí het.erogenity &mong agent.s wit.hin 
each generations. 
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Mention should be made here oí the recent and independent contribution oí Cooley 
and Soares (1994) addressing the existence and viability oí a PAYG Social Security System 
írom a point oí view which is quite similar to ours. Indeed also Cooley and Soares adopt 
the overlapping generations íramework to show that there exist majority voting equilibria 
in which Social Security is implemented by means oí a majority voting mechanism. The 
basic intuition is apparently the same we introduce here, but they concentrate more on 
quantiíying the welfare gains/losses generated by a social security tax by means oí an 
explicit parameterization and oí numerical simulations oí the model. On the other hand 
they restrict their attention only to the case in which a constant Social Security tax is the 
equilibrium outcome and do not discuss the dynamic evolution oí the political equilibrium 
and its impacto on the accumulation oí the aggregate stock oí capital. Also they consider 
only in passing the issue which is instead central to our analysis, i.e. the sustainability oí a 
PAYG system in the long run and the íorm in which it could collapse in íront oí a decrease 
in the growth rate of the population. The two exercises thereíore appear as complementary 
rather than substitute. 
'Ve should acld that a number of interesting properties oí the equilibria we describe 
seem t.o be consistent with the basic features oí existing social security arrangements. 
'Ve shO'y tho t altruistic consiclerations (as íor example in Verbon (1987) 01' Hansson and 
Stuort (1989)) are not needed to explain the intertemporal persistence oí PAYG systems. 
'Ve also shO'y that íor such a system to be an equilibrium it must entail a windfall íor the 
generation oí old people alive at the time of its introduction: they always receive a transíer 
eyen ií they had never macle a contribution. In general the equilibrium PAYG system is 
not efficient, in the sense that it is not identical to the one that would be implemented by 
a beneyolent. government maximizing the utility oí the average generation. Furthermore 
the equilibrium level of pension payments is linked to the real wages and it tends to get 
larger as income per capito grows, thereíore behaving as a superior good. 
Some other questions we are able to acldress are: 
i) Under which conditiol1s are the current social security systems sustainable? V\That is 
the most likely evolution oí social security contributions and payments? 
ii) '~lhat can be predicted about the íuture flows oí government payments and taxes given 
a certain evolution oí the demogTaphic and income distribution variables? Should we 
expect a smooth phasing out of the public social security system in íront oí decreasing 
population growth l'ates 01' a sudden collapse? 
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iii) In which direction will these movements affect capital accumulation and economic 
growth? 
iv) How will this affect the welfare of different generations, in the present and the future? 
The rest of the papel' is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the 
basic economic model, and its competitive equilibrium. In Section 3 we introduce a simple 
voting model and characterize the sub-game perfect equilibria of the underIying game. 
Then we introduce the full social security game, and the definition of equilibrium. In 
the following sections we study the basic properties of the equilibria of this game, and 
its welfare properties. In Section 4 we study the steady state equilibria, in Section 5 the 
dynamics of the equilibrium paths. Section 6 is devoted to the welfare analysis. 'Ve begin 
by summarizing the dynamic of capital accumulation when a benevolent social planner 
pick taxes and transfers in order to maximize lifetime utility of a representative agent at 
steady state, and then study the dynamic properties the paths where the rate of return 
between the investment in physical capital and the investment in pensions are equalized. 
This provides the benchmark against which the welfare properties of the political equilibria 
are discussed. In Section i we introduce a stochastic population growth rate to address 
the issue of the stability of the pay-as-you-go system. Section 8 concludes. 
2. The Economy Without Voting. 
';Ve begin with a brief illustration of the commonly adopted model of social security and 
capital accumulation. as described fol' instance in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, chapt.3). 
In this environment agents are homogenous within each generation and do not have the 
power to vote on the level of taxes and transfers, so that fiscal policies are exogenously 
given. 'Yithin this simplified framework one can establish some baseline results against 
which the predictions of a model with voting can be contrasted. As we plan to concentrate 
our analysis on PAYG systems we will skip the description of the fully funded mechanism. 
" 
Considel' an OLG model with production and agents living for two periods, with no 
labor endowment during the second one. Denote with dt = Wtrt the per-capita contribution 
of young people and with bt = (1 + nt )dt the benefits received by an elderIy person during 
the same periodo (1 +nt) is the ratio between the young and the old people at time t. The 
representative young agent in period t solves 
(2.1 ) 
subject to : et + St ~ li't(l - rt), 
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and: oS St 
The equilibrium saving function is the function of (k t , 'Tt, 'Tt+l) that solves the maximisation 
problem of the agent born at time t, when he takes as given wages and profits in the second 
period given by the capital accumulation determined by the savings of rus own generation. 
\Vhen St > O the following first order conditions for interior solutions define the optimal 
saving of an agent: 
(2.2) 
and the equilibrium saving funct,ion is the value of s such that (2.2) is satisfied. F9r non 
interior solutions, obvious modifications are necessary. The production side is summarized 
by the three equilibrium conditions: 
Wt = w(J\~t) = f(kt} - J,.~d'(kd 
7rt = 7r(J,.~d = f'(kt} 
kt+1 = st/(l + nt+l) 
'Ve write e: to denote the consumption at time t of an agent born at time s. For a given 
sequence (nI, 'Tt) of population growth rates and tax rates, a competitive equilibrium is a 
sequence (tL't, "t, e:, c:+ 1 ) of wages, profits, and consumption pairs of the agents such that 
(1) the consumption solves the maximization problem (2.1) aboye, and (2) wages, profits 
and capital stocks satisfy the three equilibrium conclitions just given. 
'Vhen nt = n and 'TI. = 'T for every t, we may define as usual a steady state equilibrium 
as an equilibrium sequence of constant wages, profits, and consumption pairs. 
3. The Economy with Votillg. 
Consider no'" the same framework as before but assume that the social security tax 'Tt 
is not a fixed sequence, but is instead chosen by the citizens through majority voting. In 
each period both generations vote on whether to have a Social Security System (SoSeSy) 
and at what level it should be implemented. 
More precisely assume the political decision making process operates in the following 
formo If at time t a SoSeSy does not exist voters will decide to either remain without one 
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01' introduce it. In the second case they have to decide what is the per-capita transfer (if 
any) to be paid to the currently old generation, d, = TtWt, and at the same time make 
a "proposal" as to the amount of money a currently young individual will receive next 
period bH1 = (1 + 7"lHI)d,+l. Instead if a SoSeSy is already in place the citizens will be 
asked if they like to disband it 01' noto Keeping it entails paying the promised amount to 
the old folks and setting a promise for the payments the currently young are entitled to 
claim next periodo 
Individua1s are homogeneous within a given generation. It is obvious then, that the 
elderly will a1wa.ys favor keeping the SoSeSy as the latter is financed by taxes on cur-
rent wage income, while the young workers face an intertemporal trade off. The young 
know that if the SoSeSy is approved at time t and maintained thereafter, they haye the 
equilibrium va1ue of the pl'oblem: 
mflX II(CI) + bll(eHl) (3.1 ) 
subject to: e, + s, ~ Wt - d t 
where d, is given and bt+1 has to be chosen. lf instead the SoSeSy is introduced at time t 
but then rejected during the following pel'iod they receive total utility 
max u( Ct) + bu( C'+l ) (3.2) 
subject to : c, + s, ~ tu, - d, 
On the other hand, if the SoSeSy is rejected at time t but introduced at time t + 1 then 
they have the equilibrium n'l1ue of 
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max u(Ct) + bu(Ct+l ) (3.3) 
subject to : Ct + St ~ Wt 
FinaUy, if the SoSeSy is rejected at both time t and time t + 1 then they will obtain the 
lifetime utility 
(3.4) 
subject to : Ct + St ~ Wt 
The key point is that "'hile the value associated to (3.3) dominates the one associated to 
(3.4) which in turn dominat.es the one given by (3.2) there is no ways in which, a-priori, 
one may rank the payoffs associated to (3.1) and (3.4) In general this will depend on the 
population growth rate nt, on the present and future stocks of capital (kt,kt+l) and on 
the promised level of benefi ts for the currently retired, bt . 
This means that. under certain circumst.ances. the young agents may find it utility 
maximizing to introduce the SoSeSy and to change their saving-consumption behavior 
accordingly. Notice though that. in arder to decide what their vote should be, the young 
need not only to be able to find a level of Tt+J that makes them better off under the first 
programo but also be sure that such a promise will be accepted by their descendants next 
periodo 
An equilibrium with Social Security is now described by a sequence of capital stocks 
plus a sequence of {Tt }~o such that, at the equilibrium of the .economy where the r's are 
taken as given, the value for the young generation in period t is at least the same as in the " 
equilibrium without Social Security, for aU t's. A formal definition is given in Section 3.2. 
The intuition for why a SoSeSy may be vot.ed into existence is that the young can 
take advantage of the system of transfers by exploiting the growth of the population and 
the process of capital accumulation that increases future labor productivity. They give up 
a fraction of their salary, but they get back in the second period a fraction of the future 
salary times the population growth factor (1 + nt+d. 
"Te should note also tha t the same argument could be applied if labor-augmenting 
technological progress were introduced in the model. In that case one would have to look 
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at the combined impact oí population growth and increases in labor efficiency units in 
order to evaluate the tradeoff. To ease the exposition we use only the symbol nt and keep 
calling it the growth rate oí the population. 
The strategy oí introducing a SoSeSy to reap benefits írom íuture generations will be 
successíul, if the sequence oí íuture payments and trausfers implicit in it does not make any 
oí the íuture median voters worse off. In other words, one has to show that the proposed 
sequence oí (b t , dt ) is an equilibrium oí a. game with au infinite number oí players. We ",ill 
do this in the íollowing subsections. 
9.1 A Simple Ga.me. 
'Ve begin wit.h a simplified modeL which will serve the purpose oí illustrating the main 
idea. 
Consider the íollowing game. There are countably many players ",ho move sequen-
tially. (In the more complex social security game each player will in íact be an entire 
generat.ion oí agents.) At. t.ime t t.he designat.ed player can choose to give out oí his pocket 
to the t)l'evious player an amount. dt. If such payment is actuaUy made, the player receiving 
t.he transíer will in íact be paid the amount (l + nt}dt rather than simply dt; the logic 
through which the precise value oí dt is select.ed will be determined later. The action oí 
each player is pelfectly observable by aU those íollowing him. As the amounts dt and nt 
are given, the action available to each player is just 
Ot E {y,Ar} 
where y stancls íor yes ancl )\i' stands íor no. A hist.ory h t - 1 oí the game at time t, when 
it is player's t turn t.o move. is: 
h t -] = (0].02,···,at-]) 
so that a strategy íor player t is a map 
(jt: (0],02, ... ,at-1) - {Y,Ar}. 
Identiíy y with 1 and Ar with O. The payoff íor player t ii; determined by the value íunction 
Ft : {O, 1} x {O, 1} - ~ defined by 
(3.5) 
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subject to : Ct + 8t ~ Wt - dtat 
and: Ct+1 ~ 7T't+1 8 t + bt+ 1at+1 
Fol' the time being we on1y need to assume that the sequences {d t , nt }~o are such that 
\'t(1, 1) ~ Vt(O,O) fol' a11 t. (3.6) 
Then one has the following l'esu1t: 
Proposition 1 For both 0"0 = O and 0"0 = 1 the strategies: 
O"t =min{0.1,a2, ... ,at-1} 
[01' a11 t ~ 1 are a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). 
Proof: By definition of SPE. we have to pl'ove that fol' any subgame given by a .histol'Y 
ht - 1 , the strategy profile (O" t. O" t+ 1 •••• ) restricted to the histol'Y ht -1 is a Nash equi1ibl'ium. 
\Ye have two possib1e cases. 
C(J.$E 1: min{ol ..... 0t-d = O; then min{ol .... ,at-1,ad = O for an), at; so 
O"t+dh t- 1.ad = O. and so (since 1-'t(O,O) > Ft(l,O)), the best choice of player t is O, 
which is equal to min{(ll, ... ,Ot-1}' 
Ca,se 2: min{ol, ... ,Ot-d = 1; then min{a1, ... ,at-1,at} = at for a11 at; then 
O"t+dht-J,ot) = at. 1\ow fmm the assumption that Vt(1, 1) ~ l/~(O,O) the best choice fol' 
t is 1. and the claim fol1ows in this case too. Q.E.D. 
Remark 1 O[ course if 0"0 = 1 then the eCjuilibrium outcome is (1,1, ... ); and if 0"0 = O 
then the eCjuilibrium outcome is (O, O.... ). 
Remark 2 Consic1er the "relenting strategies": 
0"0 = 1: O"t( al •...• o.t-1) = (lt-1 fol' t ~ 1. 
in which deviations o[generations [urther than the immediate pl'edecessor are [orgiven. It 
is easv to show that
,.'
ther are not a11 SPE.
.. 
The last remarl~ shows that when a SoSeSy is in place (i.e. a pair (b t , dd has been 
approved and paiel during the previous perioel) a one-period default is enough to destroy 
the cl'edibility of the system for the very long future, Let us now see how the equilibrium 
outcomes look like. 
Proposition 2 For an,l' equilibrium outcome ((Ir, 0.2, .. ,) o[ the garne, if a; = O [01' sorne 
t, then oi = O[01' a11 i < t. 
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Proof: By back",ard induction, it is enough to sho", that 0.;_1 = O. In fact, if 0.;_1 = 1, 
then player t - 1 will obtain Vi-1 (L O), ",hile he could insul'e fol' himself Vi-1 (O, O) > 
Vt - 1 (1, O) as payoff. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 3 The only equilibrium outcomes are of the fonn: 
(O, O, ... ,0,1,1, ... ,). 
Also let T be tlJe nrst period with at = 1. Then for any T ;::: O there is a. corresponding 
equilibrium of this formo 
Proof: Consider the equilibrium outcome (ai', ... ,a;, ... ), and let i =min{ t : o.t = 1} as 
usual, i = oc' if the set is empty. For a finite i, ai = 1 and ai-l = O; then if o.k = Ofor sorne 
k > i we have a contradiction with the previous proposition. The rest is obvious. Q.E.D. 
The fact that the SoSeSy. once established, cannot co11apse can also be changed by 
introducing a stochastic element. This will be cleal'er in Section 7. Let us see ho", the 
intuition developed in this simple game can be transferred to the fu11 blown Social Security 
problem. 
3.2 The Socia.l Security G(J,rne. 
In the simple game that we have analysed so far the amount of the tl'anfel's bt and dt 
was exogenously given. To obtain a complete model of the social security game we have 
to express these quantities as tax receipts from labor income, on the one hand, and social 
security transfers on the other ancl then derive a polítical decision rule through which their 
amounts may get c1eterminecl. This will require a richer description of a history of the 
game. 
Indeed, a fu11 descriptioll of the history of the game at time t would require the list of a11 
-. 
alternative proposals presented at the voting, as we11 as the winning outcome. In addition, 
since the competitive equilibrium is itself part of the game, we should add a complete .. 
record of a11 consumption and saving decisions. A major simplification is achieved if no 
deviation are a11owec1 al the stage in which the competitive equilibrium is determined. 
Once we do this. then the strategic aspects of the model are confined to the choice, by 
voting. of the tax rates. Let us be more precise. 
In the game that \Ve are going to define, a history ht - 1 at time t is again a sequence: 
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whel'e fol' each s E (l, ,t -1), a8 =((l~,(l;) E {Y,N} x [0,1]. Take now any infinite 
histol'Y h = (al"", al, ). For any pail' (a,-l, al) in the histol'Y the effective tax rate 
h(T/) at time t is defined to be Tt = a~-1 if a: = Y, and equal to Oothel'wise. 
The competitive equilibrium of the economy given the sequence (nt, Tt} is well defined, 
and so is the lifetime utili ty of each agent in the economy. V-le have most of the elements 
necessal'Y fol' a well defined game: action sets and payoffsj if we take each generation of 
agents as a single player, (that we can fol' convenience the generation player), we have a 
completely specified game. Formally we say: 
Definition 1 The generation player game oi the economy is the extensive form game 
v.,.J]ere: 
(1) playel's are inclexecl b.,· t = (1.2, ... ): 
(2) the action set of eac11 pla;vel' is {Y.A'} x [0,1]: 
(3) fol' eve(" histOl:V (al, 02, ... , (/ t, ... ) of actions, the pa."off to each pla.rer is equal to the 
lifetime lItilit,r of tlle representa tive agent born at time t in the competitive equilibrium of 
the econom.v with (ni' TI)' (n1+1' T1+1)' 
No\\' that we haw definecl the game. we may proceed with the definition oí the equi-
librium. 
Definition 2 Fol' a giren seqllence (ni) ofpopulation grmvtll rates, a political equilib-
rium is a seqllence {TI,1l'I,7iI,e~,e~+I};;O SllC1J that: 
(1) the sequence {WI, 7it,e:. c:+d~o is a competitive equili1Jrium given {nt, Td~o; 
(2) thel'f' exists a sequence of stl'ategies {al }¡;o fol' the generation pla."er game whic1J is 
a sllbgame perfect eqllilibl'ium, amI such t1Jat {TI };;o is the seqllenee of effective tax rates 
associat,ed wit1J the eqllilibl'ium lústOl:v, 
" 
In the next sections we stucly the equilibria that we have just defined. 
4. Steady State Equilibria 
Some equilibrium outcomes are particularly simple to studYj as usual, steady states 
are first among them. \Ve define a politica.l eq'l/.ilibrium stea.dy state to be the political 
equilibrium where a11 quantities are constant in time: in the followil1g ~~T will denote the 
steady state value of the per ca.pita capital stock, in a competitive equilibrium where the 
sequence of tax rates is fixecl to T. 
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In this section we deal only with steady states: so the subscript to k will denote the 
tax rate, and not the time periodo For instance ko means the steady state íor 7" = O, and 
not the first period capital stock. Also V (I.: T , 7") denotes the liíetime value oí utility íor 
the representative generation, at the steady state value oí the capital stock associated to 
a stationary tax rate 7" > O. 
Suppose now that, with k = I.~T' the social security system is voted down. The 
sequence oí tax rates is then set to zero, and the sequence oí v8.Iues oí capital stocks in the 
competitive equilibrium will in general diverge írom k T • The generation oí agents born in 
that period will achieve a level oí utility different írom V(kT , 7"), and dependent only on 
the value oí I.· T; let v(I.·T) denote this value. Note that clearly 
(1.:0 • O) = v(l.~o). 
\Vhich values of steady state can be supported as political equilibria? Clearly a necessary 
condi tion is tha t 
since otherwise the social security system would be immediately voted down. But it is 
easy to see that the condition is also sufficient: 
Proposition 4 Tbe steacl.,· state value (I.·T) can be supported as tbe outcome ofa political 
equilibrium ifand only ifF(I.:T,7") 2:: V(I.~T)'
 
Proof: The sequence of strategies {O't }~o where, for every history hi, O't(ht) = (Y, 7") 
if for every oS < t, as = (Y. 7"), and equal to (}/, T) otherwise satisfies our definition oí 
political equilibrium, ancl supports the steady state. Q.E.D. 
Let us see the steac1y state equilibria of some simple 1110del. 
Example 1. Let first lI(e) = log(c) and f(k) = I.~o. The steady state capital stock is 
easily íouncl to be 
1.. 0 -o) = __a_b.,....;'(,-l_-_a_'~)(_l_-_7".....:;)_~ 
'T (1 + n)[a(1 + 8) + (1- 0:)7"]' 
a decreasing íundion of 7". One can also compute that 
where (lL'T' 7íT) are the wages and the profit rate at the steady state value oí the capital 
stock. and oST = (1 + 11 )I.'T is the equilibrium saving per co.pita. The altemative íor the 
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generation of young voters when the economy is at kT is to vote the system down, expect 
no transfer from future generations, and get a lifetime utility given by: 
where s~ is the competitive equilil)lium saving in the economy with initial capital stock kT 
and zero tax transfers for 0.11 periods; the precise value is found to be s~ = (1 +n)k¿l-a) k~. 
So the difference between the two values,donoted D(,), is: 
1... )(1-0) (0+(1-0),)
D(,) = (1 + 06)(1 + o)log ( I..~: + (1 + 6)10g o 
which some additional computation shows to be equal to 
_ [(l-T)] _ (0+(1-0),)( 1 + a tJ )(1 + a )log _ + (1 + b) log + e(o(l+b)+(l-a)T) a 
where e is a constant inc1epenc1ent of T. Simple analysis of the function D shows that it 
is zero at zero (as we knew). concaye, and "'ith 
lim D(T) = -oo. 
T-l 
Fina11y, the sign of D'(O) (the c1el'iyati"e of D at ,= O) is the same as the sign of 
This last l'eléltion giws the key condition on the parameters for the existence of a steady 
state with positiye tax tl'ansfers. In particular, two cases are possible. 
In the first case, ",hen D'(O) is positive. there exists a lal'gest value of the steady state 
which can be supported as a political equilibrium. This happens fol' instance when a is 
sma11 enough. 01', fol' sorne a's (but not a11, as a careful study of the sign of D'(O) will 
l'e"eal), when agents are patient enough. In this fil'st case any smaUel' capital stock can 
also be suppol'ted, in correspondence with any lo",el' value of the tax rate, because D(,) 
is positive in this intelTal. 
On the other hand, ",hen D'( O) is negative, then the value of keeping the social security 
system is always lo",er then the "alue of voting it down, and no steady state with positive 
tl'anfers can be suppol'tec1. 
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Example 2. FOl' future reference we also characterize the steady state political equilibria 
for the case of linear utility and Cobb Douglas production function: u(e) = e and f( k) = 
1.'0. In this case we find that 
while 
This time we take the ratio of the two functions, defined R( 7), and observe that R( O) = 
1,R(1) = O,R'(O) = _02 - a + 1, and that the derivative with respect to 7 of 10g(R) is 
decreasing. 
The structure of the set of steady states in the present case is very similar to the one 
of the previous example. There are no steady states when the capital share is large (more 
precisely. ",hen o ~ 51/; -] == 0*): on the other hand when the capital share is smaU there 
is an entire inten-al 01' tax r[ltes. [0.71'] say, and correspondingly of steady states, which 
can be supported as polítical equilibria. 
5. The Dynamics of the Political Equilibrium. 
'Ve no'" mm'e to the harder task of detennining the equilibrium paths out of an initial 
conclition on the cappital stock that is not necessarily a steady state. Our aim is to deter-
mine ho'" the copital accmnulation evolws when the decision on tax rates is determined 
by a w)ting; nwch<lnism. Given the difficulty of providing a complete characterization for 
the generol Cnse we ",ill still proceecl by means of examples. 
5.1 LogaTit1l.mic utility an,} l7:neaT ]¡T(I(!netion. 
Let u(c) = log(c) ancl f(k) = a1.~ + b. This example is extremel~T simple and also 
some"'hat paradoxical (fOl' instance, one of possible steady state capital stocks at the 
political equilibrium is zero. and there is no interesting dynamics in the capital stock), but 
it should help to clarify the intuition. The maximization problem of the young agent gives 
the fol1owing saving function 
. {b o6(1 - 7t) - (1 + n)71+1 } 
::>t = n1ax ')'O . 
a(l + o 
Since the sén-ing fundion cloes not clepend on the current stock of capital, this is also the 
equilibrium saving fundian. No,,' take the difference beb....een the lifetime utility for the 
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representative agent if the social security is operating in his life, at the rates Tt and Tt+ 1, 
and the utilit.y if there are zero transfers in both periods. This difference is obviously 
independent. of k; it is equal to 
1+71. (1 + 6)log[(1- Tt) + --Tt+l]'
a 
when a6( 1 - Tt) > (1 + n )Tt+ 1, and savings are positive; and is equal to 
log( 1 - Tt) + 610g T1+ 1 + e 
when the savings are ze1'O. Rere e is a constant that depends only on the parameters 
of the model (e = 610g( (6) - ¿; log(l + 71.)(1 + 6) 10g(1 + 6), for the picky reader). Now 
consider t.he function Tt+1 = </;(Tt) defined by: 
(1 6 
Tt+1 = --Tt. when Tt <--
l+n 1+6 
6 
Tt +1 = exp ( ¿, - 1 (e - log (1 - Tt ) ) ) , when Tt > --
-1+6 
",here e is t.he const.émt c1efinec1 previously. This is the next period value of the tax rate 
necessnry, for él given t.ax rate Tt t.oday, to make the social security system at least as good 
él5 the zero trcmsfers syst.em. It is a continuous. increasing fundion, and as Tt tends to 1, 
Tt+1 t.enc1s t.o +OC'. 
1\o\v "'c eéln distinguish t",o cases. 
él) If (1 > 1 + 17 t.he gnlph of the function is a11 aboye the diagonal, for strictly positive 
T'S. SO for any init.inl positiYe value of T to make the system survive it is necessary to 
mélkc the next perioc1 tax rat.e even higher, and in finite time this rate goes aboye 1. 
Rence, there is no equilibrium with Social Security. This is quite intuitive as the direct 
investment in capit.al always dominates the rate of return on the secmity system. 
b) Télke no'" (1 < 1 + 17. There is a unique positive fixed point Tp , such that Tt+1 :s; Tt if 
Tt :s; TI" and 'vice'ue1'$f/, fol' the other values. The rate TI' is the maximum rate that can 
be supported as political equilibrium. In this case we can give a complete description 
of a11 the equilibriulll paths: 
Proposition 5 Define the coITespondence Ji'ol]] [O, TI'] to intervals of [O, 1]: 
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Tben a sequence of capital stocks and taxes (k T, ) is tbe outcome of a. political equilibrium 
" 
if and only is it is tbe solution of tbe system of difference inclusions: 
fOl" every t ~ 1. 
Of course it is crucial that the solution be defined, and contained in [0,1] for every 
periodo Take no,," the init.ial tax rate as given, with TO E [O, Tp ]. Here are two irnportant 
equilibrium paths. In the first. equilibrium Ti =Tp for t 2:: O, while the capital stock q == O. 
In the second the tax rat.e is defined by T;+1 = ~(Tl) for t 2:: Oand sorne initial condition 
T6 < Tp , and correspondingly a. capital stock sequence {kn~o converging to a steady state 
value (l+<'i~il+n)' These two sequences describe the entire set of equilibria; in fact they are 
extreme points of this set.. i. e. any equilibrium path satisfies Tt E [T1, TlJ, kt E [kl, ~'n 
In the next exampl<:, the dynamics of the capital stock are more interesting. 
!J.2 LineaT 'u.tility fI,nd Cobb·DoU.91(J..~ p1'Odu.etion. 
Let v(c) = e anc1 f(k) = ka. For a given pair of taxes (Tt,Tt+l) and a current capital 
stock kl the optimal saving of a representatin- agent is determined by solving 
max (1 - T, )WI - 8 + 6[iil+l . 8 + (1 + n)wt+l Tt+d (5.1 ) 
s~U 
The sollltion to this problem is (1-Tt )wt, 01' the int.erval [O, (1- Tt )w,], 01' O, if (-1 +67T t+ 1) is 
positin'. zel'O, 01' negat.ive respedively. Since 6ir( kt+1 ) 2:: 1 if and only if kt+1 :5 (0'6)1/( l-a) 
the equilibrinm sélving function is 
(5.2) 
which is inc1epenc1ent. of T,+l. For a given value of T, = T the equation (5.2) has a unique 
110n zero stable steac1y state. "~hen T, = Ofor 8011 t, the evolution of the per-capita stock 
of capital reduces to 
which, if the population has a constant growt.h rélt.e, converges to the steady state k'" -
. { - } 1 / (l - a ) TI fi f l l l . l 1 .. .mm (1 - a) / (1 + n). 0'6 . le rst o t le va ues over w l1C 1 t le 11Ul1ll11Ul11 IS 
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taken satisfies the Golden Rule condition only when O' = 1/2, whereas the second requires 
b(l + n) = 1. 
To determine the equilibrium strategies and the consequent evolution of the tax rate, 
let us compute the value for the representative member of the young genera,tion of turning 
down the SoSeSy al1d going alone. As a function of the current stock of capital k and of 
the expected growth rate of the population n this is 
(5.3) 
On the other hand the value of keeping the SoSeSy as a function of the same variables, of 
the current tax rate Tt amI of the proposed tax rate T1+1 is 
To organize the am'l1ysis ir is C'onvenient to distinguish three separate regions in the capital 
stock-tax rate space lR+ x [0.1]: 
I 
Rl == {( 1.', T) : ((\ b )¡::-;- ( 1 + /1) :::; (1 - T) te( k )}: 
R2 == {(l.', T) : (1 - T)W(1.'):::; (oti)6(l + 11) :::; u'(l,')}: 
R3 == {( 1.'. T) : 11' ( 1.') ~ (o ti )6 (1 + 11 ) } . 
I\'ote thCl t the boundélry bet.ween the second éll1d the third region is a line {( 1.-3 , T) : T E 
[0.1]}. The equilibrium sAving in the regions R2 and R3 is equal to (1 - T)w(k), and to 
1 (o ti) t="O (1 + 11) in Rl. From the form of the equilibrium saving function we hélve that two 
cases élre possible for tlw steacly state when the tax rate is iclentically zero: it is either 
1 1 
equal to (~~~)T'=";;" 01' it is equéll to (ob)'T"="';;'. 'Ve concentrate on the first, more interesting, 
case and assume in the rest that: 
" 
1- a' 
-- < 0'6.1 + 11. -
k 3Let us immediately note three implications ofthis assumption: First, (O'b)6(1+n) ~ • 
Second, ¡..3 is larger théln the steady state of the economy with zero taxes, and therefore 
also larger then the steady state of the economy ",ith any tax rateo Fina.lly from the form 
of the equilibrium saving function we haye thél,t. for any initial conclition and any sequence 
of télX réltes. kt ~ ".3 for any t after the initial period: in other words, the third region is 
invélriant for any competitiw equilibrium path beginning within it. 
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Since in the third region the equilibrium saving function is equal to (1 - 7 )w( k,), and 
it is easily found that the inequality V(l.~t, 7" 7t+1) ~ v(k t ) is equivalent to 
(5.5 ) 
An interesting property of (5.5), which will be used repeatedly in the future, is that it does 
not involve the stock oí capital. Rewriting (5.5) in explicit fOrp1 gives 
(5.5bis) 
If the restriction O~ o < (J5 - 1)/2 is satisfied the convex function 4> starts at the orig,in 
and has a unique interior fixed point 7 ,) which is unstable under repea.ted iterations. For 
larger values of o only the degenerate equilibrium without SoSeSy exists. The analysis is 
no\\' very similar to the pre"ious case. For any 7, larger than 7,) the next period tranfers 
necessary to make the social security system acceptable to the next generation are (recall 
tlH'lt the third region is invariant) equal to </>( TI) 01' larger, and iteration of this argument 
leacls to a tax rate lal'ger than 1 in finite time, hence the system cannot be supported. 
On the other hancl as long as the tax rate remains in the region [O, TI'J the social security 
system can be SUppol'tt'd. In faet \\'e con completely characterize the set of equilibrium 
paths. Again \\'e define the correspondence 
and then: 
Proposition 6 .4. sequellce (l.~t, TI) is al] equi1ibrium outcome of tlle gelleration p1ayer 
game if amI on1.,- if it is él solution of t.lle s,vstem of clifference illc1usiollS: 
for eve(" t ~ 1. 
The proof of this statement is immediate. 
\\'e have proved eal'lier that the third region is invariant, and therefore the compal'ison 
between the two values F and v only depends on the ta.."( rates. as formulated in equation 
(5.5) aboye. Equilibrimll strntegies are now easy to define. In this case too we may 
concentra te on a fe\\'. more interesting equilibria. 
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In the first equilibrium the tax rate is immediately set equal to the highest possible 
value compatible with the existence of a social security system. \Vhen the initial capital 
stock is less 01' equal than l·3, this rate is equal to Tp ' Then the equilibrium path has the 
form (l~I,Tll)' where the sequence l't converges to the steady state l:Tp ' \~lhen the initial 
capital stock is higher than k3 , the highest possible tax rate turns out to be lower than 
Tp ' In fact there is a curve in the capital-tax rate space, where the tax rate is decreasing 
with the capital stock, t.hat descdbes the equilibrium tax ra,te. Details are in Appendix 
2, but the intuit.ion is clear: when the capital stock is high the value of the alternative 
of dropping the social security system is too high, and the generation who introduces the 
social security system has to accept. lower transfers to make the system viable. After one 
periodo however, the equilibrium path enters the third region, and the time sequence is by 
no\\' familiar. 
In the seconc1 equilibrium we consider the sequence of tax rates defined by: 
Tt+1 = ó( TI). 
For simplicity \Ve only consic1er the case ko ~ l,3. The tax rate converges to zero, and 
-L 
the capital stock con\"('rges to the steac1y state value (~~~) of the economy with zero\-Q 
transfers. This equilibrium corresponc1s to the slow disappearence of the social security 
system. 
6. The Welfare Analysis of the Political Equilibria 
G.l The Pla.nner·s Choice 
" 
In the tradition of Diamonc1 (1965) and Samuelson (1975) we consider the tax rates 
which are efficient at st.eady state. To be precise \Ve define an efficient steady state tax Tate 
as the tax rate which gi"es, at the associatec1 value of steady state for the capital stock, 
the highest utility per capita to each generation. Note that the social planner is free to 
choose the initial enc10wment of capital stock: a possibl~ interpretation of this is that the 
economy is running from the infinite past into the infinite future. 
For the first moc1el \Ve consic1er \Ve hm'e alreac1y analyzed the steady state political 
equilibria in section 4. example 2. Let l1(c) = e, anc1 f(l') = l·o. In this case: 
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Proposition 7 Tlle efficient steady state tax rate is: 
1- 20' 
Te = 1-0' 
wit.11 conesponding stead,r state capital stock 
O' ) 1/(1-0) 
( k= (1 + n) 
jf O' ~ ~ and b( 1 + n) > 1. Tlle efficient steac1,v state tax rate is eCJual to O otberwise, witll 
st.eac1,r state capitnl st.ock: 
1/(1-0)(1 - 0') 
( (1 + n) ) 
The main lines of the proof of this proposition can be íound in the Appendix 1. The 
reader can clraw his conclusions on the efficiency of the political equilibrium by himself. 
'Ve do it later, in section 6.3, after \Ve deal with the dynamic aspect oí the issue. 
6.2 The Dynamic of Tal:c,~ a.nd Ca.]J1:ta,l 
One can giye an explanation for the inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium without 
social security by obselTing tbat tbe rates of return of tbe voluntary savings St and of the 
forced sa"ing achieyed through the social security system, T(Wt, are not equalized. In fact, 
a necessary concli t ion for efficiency is precisely tbat these two rates are equa.lised. This 
condition is not sufficient. as one can see from example 1 below: there may be more than 
one steady state in which the condition is satisfied. This poses the next question. 
From a normatiyE' point of Yiew, we may consider a social plallner ,vho, in tbe initial 
period where a capital stock ~·o is giyen, chooses the initial tax rate, and then imposes the 
equality among rates. perhaps tbrough some market mecballism. In this interpretation it is 
" 
important to cletermine the long run properties oí tbe competitive equilibrium paths tbat 
are determined in tbis Wé1Y: in particular, if tbe efficient stea.dy states are stable. Tbey will 
turn out not to be. In our framework tbe equality of rates requires 
(1 + n'+1 )W'+1 T'+1
----'----- = 7l't+1 (6.1 ) 
TtWt 
wheneyer the tax rates T" Tt+ 1 are clifferent írom zero. At a steady state with positive tax 
transfel's. this is tbe Goldel1 Rule. 
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Replacing the factor market equilibrium conditions in (6.1) and adding the capital 
accumulation equation yields a two-dimensional dynamical system in implicit form 
(6.2) 
which applies for 8011 quaclruples {( ~~t, rt}, (k t+1 , rt+d}. Fixing a constant growth rate of 
the population nt = n one can compute the unique steady state of (6.2) with positive taxes 
which is given by the pair (k* I r*) satisfying: 
(9 =.f') ·(6.3a) 
u' (w( ~,*)( 1 - T* ) - ~.* (1 + 11)) = 8u' (~~* (1 + 11)1' (k*) + w( ~~*)( 1 + n )r*).f' (~~* ) (6.3b) 
This is ob"iously the steady state at ",hich the rate of return on capital f'(~~*) - 1 equals 
the rate of return on social security taxes which also equals the rate of growth of the 
population 11. It is immediate to verify that a low population growth rate induces a higher 
steady state leYeI of per-capita célpital stock ~~*(11). 
On the other hand its effect on the efficient size of the social security transfer is 
ambiguous. Si11cE' the equé'ltion that giws equality of rates of return is satisfied for any 
value of capital ",he11 the tax rate is zero, there may be other steady states, of the forrn 
(~.* 10). For future comparisoll "'C:' characterize the behavior of the system for sorne specific 
pairs of utility ancl production functions, 
Example 1 (Continue). As in example 1 of Section 4 let u(c) = logc, anc1 f(k) = ~~o. 
"~e get: 
bii(l- r)w - r'(l + n)w' 
s= 
7r(1+6) 
where él "prime" denotes next perioc1 variable. By substituting the equilibrium values for 
tU, w' and r. we get the fo11o"'ing expression for the dynamical system (6.2) 
06(1 - Q )(1 - rd~~fkt+1 = --~-......;,...-_.:.....:..._-.:.......;----0(1 + 6)(1 + n) + (1 - 0')(1 + n)rt+l 
aTI~'f 
T'+1 = -----(1 + 11 )/\',+1 
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There are two possible st.eady states: 
Q' )1/(1-0) 6 Cl') 
(( (l+n) '(1+6)-(1-Cl') ; 
and 
~.... (( 6(1-0') )6 )(~2,T2)= (1+6)(1+n) ,0. 
when (1~6) - (¡~o) is positive. In this case the first pair is unstable, and the second stable. 
Example 2 (Continue). The situation is very similar in the next example, which uses 
the utility and production functions considered in example 2 of section 4: u(c) = c, and 
.f(k) = kO • The sa\'ing fundian is 
Together with the conc1ition that equalizes the return on private saving to the return on 
social security payments, (6.4) yields a dynamical system for (Tt,~'d 
7. _ • {(I-Tt)(I-0)~~f (.l:)1/(1-0)}
ht+l - mm ( , ou1 + n) 
Cl'Tt Cl'Tt kf }Tt+l = nlax { . . ._(1 - 0')(1 - Td' (l + n)(ob)I/(1-0) 
Setting aside t.he hairline case in which 6(1 + n) = 1, when o < 1/2 the latter has two 
stationary states: 
(k*.T*) = ((_0'_)1/(J-0), 1- 20') 
1 1 l+n 1-0 
and -, 
(~~;, T;) = ((1- Cl')l/(l-Ol,O). 
1+n 
'Vhen 6( 1 + n) > (1- o )/0 the largest of the tW() steady states is smaller than (Cl'6)1/(1-0), 
and so eventually t.he behavior around the two st.ationary states is governed by the system 
~. _ (1 - Td(l - o)~'f 
t+ 1 - ..:..---(1';"+~1-7)--..;.~ 
Cl'Tt 
Tt+ 1 = -:----~--(1 - a )(1 - Ttl 
23 
The two eigenvalues defining the linear approximation near each of the steady states are 
respectively 
A2(ki, Tn = a, A2(l~i, Tn = _0_'_
1- a 
Since a < 1/2 the first steady state is a saddle and the second a sink. The stable manifold 
of (Tt, k;) is then a vertical line in the (T, k) space in correspondence to the value T = T:. 
As we have seen, for this value of the parameters the efficient steady state taxes are positive, 
and equal to T2. SO the efficient steady state is the unstable steady state. For all initial 
conditions (TO, J.~o) such that TO < Tt the equilibrium path converges to the stationary state 
(T2,J.~i) without SoSeSy. \\'hen TO = T: it converges to the stationary state (T:, k;). There 
is no equilibrium that begins with TO > T;, since the tax rate becomes larger than'1 in a 
finite number of periods. In the other case of o > 1/2 only (ki, T2) is an admissible steady 
state, hence the only efficient steacly state, which is now unstable. 
6.3 The politiClJ,1 c'l'w:b:b1'1:a 
In this sedion we show, by means of a simple example, that the political equilibria are 
typically inefficient, but may be so either because there is too much capital accumulation 
at equilibrium, 01', an alternative possibility with different parameters, because there is too 
li t tle capi tal accu1l1ulation. 
The moclel we consicler is the the one labelled so far as Example 2: linear utility 
and Cobb Douglas procluction fundion (see sections 4 ancl 6.2). The critical parameters 
turn out to be the capital sh¡ne, o and the discount factor 6 times the population growth 
rate (1 + 11). The reason for the inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium without social 
security transfers is unambiguous and well known: without transfers there is an overac- " 
cumulation of capital at equilibrium. This is obvious from the equation determining the 
value of the steacly state capital. which is decreasing in T; so when it is efficient to have 
positive transfers it is so because the equilibrium capital will be reduced. 
It is easy first of all to determine the relative position of the efficient tax rate with 
respect to the intelTal [O, T,,], If \Ve substitute the v~ue \ __2: into the equation that 
determines Tp we have that Tp > Te if and only if O < 1/2; so that over the entire parameter 
region, 
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Some easy ca1culus shows that TIJ is an increasing function of o, and that limo-_o Tp = 1. 
There are therefore three completely different possibilities: 
1. \Vhen o E [0*, 1] the efficient level of tax rate is zero, but 80150 the only tax rate that 
can be supported as political equilibrium is zero. 
2. For a11 the vaIues of o E [1/2, o"'] (and any 6), and for values of o and 6 such that 
o < 1/2 and 6(1 + n) < 1 there are many levels of tax rate that can be supported in 
a political equilibrium. In the same region the efficient level of tax rate is zero. So in 
this region any political equilibrium steady state with positive transfers is unambiguously 
inefficient, with a steady state level of capital stock too low. 
3. The political equilibria are still inefficient, but for the opposite reason, in the rest of the 
parameter space. \\~hen o =:; 1/2 and cS( 1 + n) > 1 then the ma.....imum tax rate that can 
be supporteel at equilibrium is higher than the efficient rate, and so the political equilibria 
can be ineffíeient because there is too 111uch 01' too little capital accumulation. 
7. Stochastic Population Growth 
In the recent historical experience of many countries the immediate cause for the 
crisis of the social security system seems to be the long run fall in the popula.tion growth 
rate coupleel with a relatively lo", growth rate of labor productivity. Since this is not an 
unexpecteel event. but rather quite foreseeable. and since it seems to lead to either the 
dismissal of the spf'eial pHy-as-you-go version of the system 01' to a sharp reduction of 
the benefí ts paiel to retireel indi"iduals, it is natural to ask if such an institution could 
be supporteel as the equilibrium result of rational decision making of voters, and if so, 
what predictions ",e can derive from this explanation. The model that we present now will 
provide a first answer to these questions. As in the rest of the papel' we restrict attention 
to changes in the growth rate of population, the extension to exogenous la.bor-augmenting 
technological progress being immediate. 
7.1 Logarithm.ic ·/I.tilitlJ. linea.r production a.nd stochastic pop'/Llation growth. 
\Ve reconsider here one of our examples (Example 1), modified to make the growth 
rate of population a stochastic process. More precisely we assume that there exists a 
sequence of growth rates {11 (j )} .~o satisfying the restrictions nU + 1) < n(j), for a11 j, 
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and limj~oc' n(j) = O, and a trallsition probahility 
PI' (nt+l = n(j);nt = n(j)) = 1- p, 
PI' (nt+1 = n(j + 1); nt = n(j)) = p; 
for a11 j, with O< p < 1. The definition of equilibrium with a stochastic growth rate of the 
population is very similar to the one we have adopted for the models with a detenninistic 
dynamic of the population grO\vth rateo "Ve refer the reader to Appendix 3. for a formal 
statement. "Ve let 
a> 1, 
so that (1 > 1 + nI, eventua11y almost surel~r. The strategy profiles of the political equilib-
rium are definec1 as follows. Let nI be n(.i). then 
Ut(h¡) = (y,r(n(J)),r(n(J + 1))) 
if for every $ < t, = (Y. T(11(i)). T(l1(i + 19r)))), where n 8 = n(i). On the other hand(1" 
the strategy of the plélyel' t sets 
in aH other cases. The proof of this statement can be found in Appendix 1 as part of the 
proof of the fo11owing charactel'ization of the politica.l equilibrium. 
Proposition 8 If (1 > L tlJen rOl' an.,. polítical equilibrium of the genel"ation pla;yer game, 
e"ent uall.,.- almost slIl'el.,. TI = OrOl' e,.-el'." t: tlJa t is tlJe social secul'i t)' sJ'stem ís termínated 
almost sUl'el.,· 
The proof is in Appenc1ix 1. 
Of course the proposition is interesting only if there are equilibria which give as an 
outcome tax rates which are not identically zero. This requires that at least in the initia.l 
periods the population growth rafe is sufficiently high to make the return from the savings 
invested in the security system larger than the return from private investment. To avoid 
uninteresting situations we assume. in adc1ition, that 
Q < (1 - p) (1 + no). 
The proof of proposition 10 will make it clear why on the right hand side we do not have 
the expected growth rafe. 
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"Te now prove that equilibria with positive tax rates and transfers in the initial periods 
exist, even if it is known that the system of social security will be eventually dismissed 
almost surely. As usual, the construction of an equilibrium rests on the comparison between 
the value of keeping the social security system, and the value of dropping it. In the model 
we are discussing the second value is a constant, v: 
v = (1 +8)log(a(1 ~ 8)) + 810g(a8). 
First we prove a simple proposition which provides the constructive methods through which 
equilibria are found: 
Proposition 9 Thel'e is a seCjuence o[ tax l'ates {T(j)} ~o such that 
nlax {log[(l - T(J))b - s] + 8(1 - p)log[as + (1 + n(j))T(j)b]+ 
s~o 
+bplog[os + (1 + HU + l))T(j + l)b]} = v (7.1 ) 
[01' a11 j '5, a1)(1 TU) > Ofol' some j. 
The proof is in Appendix 1. 
It is based on backward induction and encompasses the following steps: 
1. First, for any HU) we determine the value of T (call it LU)) which satisfies the following 
condition: "If LU) is to be paid to the old generation, then the program (a,x(j), O) 
wins the elections.'· In other words, when xU) is the promised tax rate a realization 
of the growt h rate n (j + 1) will trigger the collapse oí the SoSeSy. Notice that for 
some n(j )'s such él tax rate may not exist in [O, J]. 
2. Let HU) be él growth rate fol' which a L(j) exists and call it the least growth rateo 
Taking nU) as given one can use (7.1) and proceed backward to determine the sequence 
of tax rates that yielc1 an equality in each periodo 
3. Fina11y let the first young generation choose the initial value T(O). This is accomplished 
by selecting the best among a11 the sequences of TU) which were computed in the 
previous step. Notice that each such sequence (and hence each initial T(O)) corresponds 
to a different least growth rateo 
The equilibl'ium ,ve construct has a stationary nature: to each possible population 
growth rate is associatec1 a tax rate, which is positive as long as the population growth is 
higher than a critical level, and then drops to zero. At that point the system collapses. 
')-
-, 
When the population growth rate reaches the level which is immediately next to the critica1 
rate the generation of young voters still prefers to keep the system going, even if they know 
that with positive probahility they will pay and then will not be paid back by the next 
generation. Since the rate n, is falling over time, it is not irnmediately clear how the 
equilibrium tax rates behave over time. We have: 
Proposition 10 The sequence of tax rates descibed in proposition 9 above is the outcome 
of a political equilibrium. 011 this equilibrium the sequence of tax rates is decreasing, that 
lS 
'TU + 1) < 'TU) 
for all j. 
8. Conclusions. 
"~e have shown that a PAYG Social Security System may be supported as the sub-
game perfect equilibrium of an infinite horizon game in which economic agents choose the 
contribution ancl benefit rates by majority voting in every period and competitive mar-
kets cletermine saving ancl consumption levels. No altruistic motivations are needed in our 
model to explain the existence of PAYG pension plauso 
A majority voting equilibrium may leacl to the estahlishment of social security transfers 
from the young to the old even in circumstances in which the competitive equilibrium would 
otherwise be converging to a consumption efficient steady-state. Vve conclude from this 
faet that when social security polieies are cleterminecl through voting, one may expect them 
to be typieal1y inefficient. 
An interesting property of our moclel is the fol1owing. If a society faces an uncertain 
but asymptotically decreasing growth rate of the lahor force the majority voting equilib-
rium willleacl to the disappeareance of the PAYG SoSeSy within a finite number of periods.. 
The actual elimination of the SoSeSy v,,'ill be votecl in at the time in which a certain lower 
bound on the growth rate of the labor force is realized. Nevertheless we a1so show that in 
the meanwhile, i.e. until the least growth rate is not realized, it is perfect1y rational for 
the meclian voter to maintain alive a SoSeSy. In this circumstances the majority voting 
system leads to a non-inereasing sequence of taxes ancl benefits rates. 
The moclel 81so suggests 8 number of interesting questions worth investigating. One 
wouId be interested in c1assifying the efficiency properties oí the political equilibria and 
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the set oí "constitutional restrictions" (ií any) that might guarantee the maximization oí 
one or another type oí social welfare íunction by means oí the majority voting system. 
One would also like to veriíy the extent to which the political equilibrium with PAYG 
social security is modified by the introduction oí income heterogeneity within each gen-
eration. A first step in this direction can be found in Tabellini (1990) who uses a static, 
two-period version of an OLG economy and shows that social security can be supported 
in a majority voting equilibrium by a coalition of old people and the poorest among the 
young ones. On the other hand he does noto examine the dynamic implications of this 
extension oí the redistributional features of a PAYG system to the intragenerationallevel 
and the impact this may have on the set oí intertempora.l equilibria. By providing further 
incentives to redistribute income, such a modification would certainly lead to an increase 
in the size of the SoSeSy as wel1 as in the number of circwnstances in which it may be 
adoptecl. On the other hancl the reduction in saving this would cause may be large enough 
to bring about a col1apsE' oí the system more oíten than in the previous circumstances. 
Finally one is interested in characterizing a more sophisticated type oí redistributive 
politica! equilibrium in which people haYe to simultaneously vote upon a tax to finance 
SoSeSy allCl él tax to finanee the public education system. This is considered in Boldrin 
ancl Rustichini (19950). 
29 
9. Appelldix 
9.1 Appendix 1. 
Proof of propositioll 7. W'e first determine the competitive equilibrium steady state 
as a function of the parameters, for a fixed tax rateo The steady state value is given by 
(0'8)6 if: 
...:..(1_-_0',,-)(:-1_-_7....:..) > 0'8 
1 + n -, 
and 
k.,. = ((1 - 0:)(1 - 7))6. 
l+n 
otherwise. The value TO is determined by taking equality in the first inequality above and 
is equal to TO = max{ 1-0\J1~~J+11)), O}. lVe now denote for convenience },:"'o =(0'8)6, 
substitute the value of the steady state capital in the utility function of the representative 
agent, aud obtain a function of T which is defined piecewise, and we denote by U(7). In 
fact when T ~ TO the function is equal to (1 - a.)k~o [1 - 7 + 8(1 + n)7]; while when 7 ~ 70 
the function U(T) is equal to 8[( 1- 7 )w( k.,. )1r( },'.,. ) + w( k.,. )(1 +n)7 J. Clearly the only thing 
we need to do is to compute the derivative of [1(7) in the interval [70,1]. AIgebra, and the 
use of the equation d;/ = - 1111 gives that this derivative has the same sign as 1-20 - 7.  
0 
Our claim then follows. Q.E.D. 
Proof of propositioll 8. A necessary condition for a sequence of tax rates 7t to be 
the outcome of él political equilibrium is that the value of keeping the system is larger 
in each period, and every realization of the (ni) process, than the value of dropping it. 
Recall that the second and third components of al(hd, denoted a;(111)' i = 2,3, are the 
tax rates that the generation of young voters is setting for future periods in the evellt 
that the population g,Towth rate does not change, 01' respectively does change. We denote' 
these two rates T] and 7 2 respectively. In our case, since the equilibrium saving function 
equals the solution of the maximization problem of the representative young consumer, 
this inequality is equivalent to: 
max log(b( 1 - 71) + 8(1 - p) log( os + b(l + n(j))a2 (h t )+ 
8~0 
6plog(as + b(l + nU + 1))a3 (hd ~ v; 
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where nt = n(j). 
To prove our claim it is enough to prove that there is no solution to this infinite system 
of inequalities. Since the left hand side, keeping everything else fixed, is increasing in the 
population growth rate, and the rate itself reaches almost surely in finite time any value 
lower than the initial, it is enough to show that there is no solution to the same system 
when the population growth rate is fixed to a value n such that a > 1+ n. So it is enough 
to prove that the system 
maxlog(b(l - 'Tt} + 8(1- p)log(as + b(l + n)'Tl+ 1 + 6plog(as + b(l + n)'Tl+ 1 ~ v s~O 
does not have a solution extending in the infinite future. The latter defines implic-
itly a stochastic diffel'ence inclusion in the folling way. Let first ~('Tt} be the· set of 
('TI, 'TI) E [0,1]2 such that the inequa1ity is satisfied. This ~ plays here a role similar 
to the correspondence of the same name defined in section 5. 
The stochastic diffel'ence inclusion is defined now as: 'Tt+l E \lI( 'Tt), where 
and 
':Ve prove that fol' any path TI which is not identically zero the correspondence ~('Tt) is 
empty valued in finit.e time, a1most surely. The proof will extend to the present case the 
argument that. proves a similar statement fol' the deterministic case, discussed in section 
5. 
Let us list the propel'ties of ~ that ",ill be usec1 in the sequel: 1. The set ~(T) is 
com-ex: this follows from the fact that the function T -t log( as + b( 1 + n)T) is concave. 
Also it is easy to show by implícit differentiation that at the point of intersection between 
the diagonal in [0,1]2 ancl the boundary of this set the supporting 1ine to the set has normal 
vector proportiona1 to (1 - p,p). 2. Let 4> be the function defined in section 5.1. We know 
that its gra.ph lies above the diagonal. Also, from the convexity of the image of ~: 
Addition of sets is defined as usual, element by elemento Now from the fact that 4>( 'T) > 1 
fol' T large enough (precise1y, fol' T > 1 - ee, where e is the constant defined in section 
5.1), our claim follows. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of propositioll 9. Define 
\lJ 1(T, n) == m:.x{log[(l - T)b - s] + 6(1- p)log[as + (1 - n)Tb] + 6plogas} 
This is the lifetime utility achievable by a young genel'ation starting with nt = n and Tt = T 
and expecting to l'eceive T if n'+l = n and O if n'+1 < n. Notice that the equilibl'ium 
saving level S"(T) is positive ií (1- T)b > Oand that s"(O) = 1~6' Oí coul'se \lJ 1(0,n) = v 
fol' any n; but also the fundion \lJ 1 satisfies limT _1 \lJ 1(1,n) = -00 and 
O\lJ1(O,n)=~((1-p)(1+n)-1) >0 
OT s"(O) a 
if and only if 1~1l < 1 - p. Our assumptions imply that this is true for a non-empty but 
finite set of population growth rates in the sequence nU). Now if we take any such nU) 
to be the value of 11 in the fundion \lJ 1, we concluele that a L(j) > Oexists fol' any j such 
that \lJ 1 (L(j), n(j)) = v. 
"Ve move now to the backwarc1 induction construetion of the tax rates. Take n(j) and L(j) 
as defined in the previous step. Recall that this implies that when nU + 1) is realized the 
equilibrium tax is zero anc1 the system co11apses. Fol' i = 1,2, ... assume that the value of 
TU - i) which soh-es 
m:x {log[(l - TU - i))b - s] + 6(1 - p)log[as + (1 + n(j - i))T(j - i)b]+ 
+6p logras + (1 + n(j - i + 1) )L(j - i + 1)b]} = v 
has been founel. \Ve look for the next value TU - i - 1) to be associated to nU - i - 1) by 
solving 
where 
m~x {log[(l- T)b - s] + 15(1- p)log[as + (1 + n)Tb]+ 
+e5p logras + (1 + nU - i) )L(j - i)b]} = v 
Note that 
and 
W2(0, n) > ma..'X log[b - s] + e5logas = v 
s 
hence a solution TU - i - 1) always exists. Repeating this procedure fol' a11 i = 1, ... ,j -1 
and a11 n(j) generates a the required sequence of non-zero tax rates. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of proposition 10. As usual given the equalit,y between the value of keeping the 
social security system and the value of dropping it, a sequence of equilibrium strategies is 
easy to define, and is given in the main texto 
Vve turn to the real issue, of proving that the equilibrium sequence of tax rates is 
decreasing over time; in fact, we prove the statement for any sequence (T(j) satisfying the 
equality stated in proposition 9. First we fix sorne notation: jo is the index for the least 
growth rate to which is associated a positive tax rate; so T(jO) > O, and T(j) = Ofor any 
j 2:: .io + 1. \~re also denote the function \IJ( 8; n(j), T(j), n(j + 1), T(j + 1)) as: 
10g[(1- T(j))b - 8] + 6(1- p)10g[a8 + (1 + n(j))T(j)] + 6plog[a.s + (1 + n(j + 1))T(j + 1)b]. 
For future use, "'e no", note an obvious but importal1t property of \IJ. The function 
(8,T) ---+ \IJ(8; n(j),r, n(.i + l),T(j + 1)) is concave, since it is the composition of concave 
and linear functions. Therefore the function: r ---+ maxB~O \IJ(s; n(j), T,n(j + 1),T(j + 1)) 
is also concave. 
\Ve nm\" proceecl with t,he proof of our main claim. The proof is by induction on the 
index.( \Ye begin with the inequality 
T(jO) :s T(jo - 1). 
l\ote first that for any 8 and T the following inequality is immediate from the definition of 
\IJ: (recall that r(jl! + 1) = O): 
\IJ(8:n(jo),r.n(jo + l),T(ju + 1)):S W(8;n(jo -l),r,n(jo),r(jo)). 
Hence the same inequality is preserved by taking maxs~o on both sides: this operation 
gives us t,wo funnions of T •. Wjo ancl wio-J' say, with the first function less 01' egual to 
the function on the second, pointwise oyer [0.1]. W'e have already seen that these two 
functions are equal to v for at least one value of r (in fact, we have already substituted one 
of these values, T(jO), in the corresponding '11). From the fact that they are concave we 
no", know that this yalue is unique; and from the inequality between the two functions we 
know that the value for the fundion '11 jo' T(jU) is less 01' equal to the value of the function 
\IJ(jo - 1) at r(jo - 1). 
No", for the other t¡:¡x rates. By the induction hypothesis we have the inequality 
TU + 1) :s r(j), and we no\\' claim that r(j) :s T(j - 1). The induction hypothesis, 
together with the ineqml1ity cm growth rates of population, gives the inequality: 
'1J(8:n(j),r,nU + l),r(j + 1)):S '1J(s;n(j -l),r,n(j),T(j)) 
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for any 7. The argument now is identical to the one given in the first step, and we conclude 
our proof. Q.E.D. 
9.2 Appendix 2. 
Recall that under our assumption on the parameters, from any initial capital stock 
larger than ~~3 the competitive equilibrium sequence, irrespective of the tax rate, has value 
less than ~~3 after one period; so we are looking for the highest tax rate that makes the 
function V larger than v, conditional on the next period tax rate being equal to 7 p ' Let 
us now begin to describe the first region. Here the inequality V(k,T,Tp ) ~ v(k) is found 
to be equivalent to 
The equality determines a fundion from 7 to k; it is immediate that this function IS 
decreasing in 7. The same remarks '~\'e just macle hold in the case of the second region. 
Here the inequali ty between 1r and l'. again conditional on the next period tax rate being 
equal to 7 p , is equivalent to: 
Calculus shows that the equality determines a function from tax rate to capital stock, 
decreasing, and with value at 71, equal to ~.:j, as it shoulcl. 
9.3 AppenrliJ.: 3, 
Here we provicle the relevant definitions fol' the model with stochastic population 
growth rates. They follow closely the lines of the definitions for the deterministic model. 
", 
A ta.x proce.q•q is a measurable function from the history of the economy to [0,1]. 
Definition 3 Fol' a given pair oi pl'ocesses oi population gl'owtll ra.tes and tax rates, a 
competitive equilibrium is apl'Ocess (U't.rr,.c~,c~+d such that, Blmost sure1y: 
(1) the equilibrium conditions {ol' t11e fil'ms in sectioll 2 above aJ'e satisfied; 
(2) the saving pl'Ocess (8,) maximizes tlle expected utility oi the representative young 
agent. conditional 011 the history; 
(3) mal'kets c1ear. 
On the basis of this, we say that: 
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Definition 4 A generation player game is the extensive (orm game where 
(1) players are indexed by tE (1,2, ... ); 
(2) the action set o{ each player is {Y,N} x [0,1]2; 
(3) {or ever,r histoIJ' o{ the population groll'th rates and actions, the payoff to the gener-
ation player t is the expected utility at the corresponding competitive equilibrium condi-
tional on that history. 
The element (Y, TI, T2) oí the action set is to be interpreted as follows: the generation 
oí young players accepts to pay the tax rate set in the previous period, and sets a transíer 
rate (to themselves) oí TI in the event that the population growth rate stays constant, and 
T2 otherwise. 
\Ve also remarl~ that hist.ories are no,," a list oí past actions oí the generation players, 
and oí the outcome oí the population growt.h raJe in the past; to be precise by a history 
at t.ime t we mean an element oí t.he íorm (17],0], ... ,Ot_],n¡). Finally we say that: 
Definition 5 Far a gín.'l1 stoc1wstic process of the populatioll, (nt), a political equi-
Iibrium is a pl'Ocess (Tt.U·t.irt,c:.c~+¡) such tlwt: 
(1) the process (lt'I' irt. c:, c:+ 1) is a competitive equilibrium for the given population and 
tax pracesses: 
(2) there exists a seCjllellce «(j t) af strategies af tlJe genera tian player game wlIich is sub-
game perfect eCjllilibl'illm amI gives as alltcame the pl'ocess (í¡). 
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